Why Is Government Transparency and Accountability Crucial in the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue Process?

Why does the role of civil society matter for the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?

The EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia started with the promise of promoting both normalization of relations between two countries and regional stability in the Western Balkans. Over a decade later, while the process has certainly contributed in both directions it is far from any sort of a conclusion. One could argue that relations between Kosovo and Serbia have not been moving towards normalization, but have experienced deterioration, and the EU seems to have lost its grip on the process. The op-eds by Dr Gëzim Visoka and Isak Vorgučić offer an important reflection on the limitations of the current approach of the normalization dialogue and outline what must change. Building on their insights, and in accordance with EU’s own commitments outlined in its Concept on Peace Mediation from 2020, this introduction argues for a reset of the dialogue process around three pillars: first, that transparency is essential for legitimacy; second, that civil society must reclaim its independent role as a guardian of minority rights, and third, that sustainable peace depends on rejecting populist nationalism and fostering genuine social reconciliation. These are not abstract ideals, they are concrete commitments the EU has already endorsed. 

FIRST, 

Transparency should not be optional.

One of the core problems in the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue has been the near-total absence of transparency. As Visoka argues, the failure to keep the public informed, engaged, or meaningfully consulted has resulted in low trust, selective interpretations of agreements, and ultimately, a legitimacy deficit. Vorgučić’s perspective echoes this concern from within the Kosovo Serb community, where many are left uncertain about the aims and terms of the process. This stands in stark contrast to the EU’s own normative commitments. The Concept on EU Peace Mediation adopted in 2020 highlights transparency, inclusivity, and accountability as fundamental to effective and legitimate mediation. It states that “the EU should consistently engage on the basis of its foundational values… including respect for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights” and that success should be judged not only by outcomes but by the “strengthening of dialogue infrastructures” and “inclusive process design.” Yet in practice, the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue has often ignored these very principles. National parliaments, municipal institutions, and civil society actors are often excluded from the process, and even the public is treated as a passive audience. If the EU wants to uphold its credibility as a value-based actor, it must align its mediation practices in the Western Balkans with its own norms and standards. However, for EU to promote inclusivity and transparency of the normalization dialogue it requires it has suitable partners for such an approach in Kosovo and Serbia, and currently it does not. There have also been some positive signs from the EU lately, on increasing consultations with civil society. High Representative Kallas visit this May to Serbia and Kosovo included meetings with civil society.

SECONDLY,

Civil society must be more assertive in its agency to promote minority rights, especially when it is difficult.

Both op-eds draw attention to the erosion of civil society’s role in fostering peace and accountability. Visoka argues that existing civil society-led peace initiatives are fragmented, short-term, and often disconnected from structural mechanisms of dialogue and prevention. Vorgučić goes further, warning that parts of Kosovo’s civil society have become echo chambers of the government, hesitant to challenge nationalist narratives or defend the rights of vulnerable groups. In the recent period, there have been some genuine attempts from civil society for a more coordinated and assertive role, such as through Kosovo Civic Alternative (KCA). This multiethnic civil society group supports the normalization dialogue and has publicly reacted on a few occasions to allegations of violations of the rights of Kosovo Serbs. Also, the Kosovo Peace and Democracy Summit (KPDS) has been jointly organized by Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs as a platform for dialogue and cooperation not only between civil society in the region. For the EU as well, civil society is central to mediation policy or all-of-society approach. The EU Concept emphasizes the role of civil society as a “partner” in sustaining peace, building bridges, and promoting inclusivity, particularly for marginalized and minority groups. But inclusivity is not just about who sits at the table, it is also about who civil society chooses to represent and protect when the dominant discourse becomes exclusionary. As Vorgučić reminds us, civic courage is unpopular but necessary. Civil society in Kosovo should be bold in standing up even when it means opposing prevailing narratives.

THIRD,

In order for normalization dialogue to succeed we need to dismantle nationalist populism.

The EU’s facilitation efforts have often reduced normalization to a technocratic exercise, focused on documents, implementation matrices, and “constructive ambiguity.” However, as both op-eds make clear, the real barrier to normalization is political, which means that as long as the Serbian government rejects Kosovo’s right to exist as a state, hopes for sustainable normalization of relations between the two countries will remain elusive. Additionally, the entrenchment of nationalist-populist leaderships who treat compromise as betrayal and dissent as treason is not conducive to normalization dialogue of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. In this environment, as Vorgučić warns, even basic acts of interethnic understanding are stigmatized, while Visoka highlights how the elite-level stalemate sabotages interethnic dialogue on the ground. Here too, the EU’s own Concept offers important reference. It calls for mediation to be “inclusive of peace constituencies” and to address “root causes of conflict.” It also emphasizes that mediation should not reinforce exclusion, but rather “build trust between communities” and “reconstitute social contracts.” Yet in Kosovo and Serbia, the current process, especially from the government, does the opposite, as it sidelines the very constituencies that can build peace from below. As a matter of fact, while relations at the political level and between the two states seem not so normal, civil society in both countries is making an effort to facilitate greater exchange and dialogue between communities at the grassroots level. If normalization is to be more than a façade, it must be rooted in a goal of societal transformation, not just elite consent. But this, first, requires that at least the elites have some level of normalization of relations. In other words, without the success of the normalization dialogue at the state level, efforts of societal reconciliation or transformation of how we see each other will be illusive. What Visoka and Vorgučić are telling us is that this means creating political space for moderate voices, depoliticizing ethnicity, and investing in practices and efforts that reflect Kosovo’s multiethnic reality.

The European Union has the tools, the normative framework, and the leverage to support a credible and sustainable normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. But it must practice what it preaches. The current model of dialogue often contradicts EU’s own principles by sidelining transparency, and sometimes enabling nationalist populism. To reset the process, the EU and the parties must introduce to the process a dialogue around citizens as well, not just negotiators.

Conclusion

In this piece, I have sought to synthesize the arguments presented in the op-eds by Dr. Gëzim Visoka and Mr. Vorgučić, while also offering a personal reflection. From my perspective, the transparency and accountability of the government regarding the normalization dialogue have significantly declined in recent years. Government officials appear more inclined to participate in civil society events organized by think tanks from EU member states, while often disregarding invitations from local organizations in Prishtina that focus on the dialogue.

Several good practices that once contributed to transparency—such as regular reporting to the Kosovo Assembly on the progress of the dialogue, the publication of annual and periodic updates, and the issuance of timely press releases before and after meetings—have largely been abandoned. This trend runs counter to the stated commitments of political parties to openness and democratic oversight.

Interestingly, public perception does not fully align with these concerns, as surveys suggest. A recent study by NGO CASA indicates that 44% of Kosovo Albanians believe the government has provided sufficient information about the dialogue, while another 33% express some satisfaction with transparency but believe more is needed. This suggests a noticeable gap between how civil society actors perceive the state of openness in the normalization process and how the public views it. As a result, the government may feel less public pressure to improve its communication and accountability around the dialogue.

The Serbian version can be found here:  Zašto je Transparentnost Važna u Dijalogu između Kosova i Srbije i Kako je Ostvariti?

These op-eds are part of a project supported by NED (National Endowment for Democracy), titled “Increasing Government Transparency and Accountability in Interethnic Dialogue,” and implemented by KCSS. The authors wrote the specific op-eds within their own capacities. As such, the views represented in these op-eds do not necessarily represent the views of KCSS or NED.