28/04/2025
Executive Summary
This report presents the outcomes and insights from four webinars conducted within the Work Package 6, as part of Task 6.4 within the SMIDGE Project, which is dedicated to examining and countering extremist narratives. Each webinar convened researchers, journalists, policy experts, and civil society representatives to explore how particular types of extremism—from far-right to religious—develop and gain traction, as well as how different regional contexts shape the spread of radical beliefs. While collectively focusing on how extremist messages resonate with middle-aged audiences, each session tackled distinct thematic or geographic dimensions of the broader phenomenon.
Altogether, the four webinars featured 16 speakers in total (4, 5, 3, and 4 speakers across the respective events). Over the course of the project, the sessions were held from March 2024 to January 2025, and each attracted a robust mix of participants. Webinars were recorded and made publicly available, garnering approximately 500 views on YouTube and reaching 3,000 impressions on LinkedIn, among others. To further expand the audience and sustain impact, the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) will organize a targeted boost campaign on social media platforms, hoping to maximize outreach and engage older demographic groups who might be either susceptible to extremist messaging or strategically positioned to counter it.
Overview of the Four Webinars:
Understanding Far-Right Extremism (March 29, 2024). Held as the inaugural session of the series, this webinar featured 4 speakers specializing in radicalization studies, genocide research, conspiracy theory analysis, and peace and security policy. The conversation centered on the growing influence of far-right political parties and movements across Europe and the Western Balkans. Speakers highlighted how economic anxiety, demographic shifts, anti-immigrant sentiment, and political disillusionment have coalesced into potent far-right messaging. They noted that while younger people often appear in headline-grabbing extremist actions, middle-aged and older cohorts possess significant economic and social capital, which can be wielded to shape political outcomes or legitimize reactionary platforms. Panelists also underscored the importance of media environments— particularly the role of sensationalist tabloids and digitally-native propaganda outlets that prime audiences for xenophobic discourse. The event drew a geographically diverse audience of practitioners, academics, and journalists, with engaged questions touching on how to best challenge xenophobic dog whistles and how to strengthen inclusive civic identities.
Exploring Religious Radicalization Among Middle-Aged Individuals (June 28, 2024). The second webinar hosted 5 speakers, bringing together sociologists, theologians, and fact-checkers with deep expertise on how religious identities, conspiracy theories, and extremist propaganda intertwine. While acknowledging that religion itself need not engender violence, panelists emphasized that certain extremist groups skillfully weaponize religious symbols and narratives to galvanize middle-aged followers. They provided examples of how personal grievances ranging from family or financial stress to existential fears—can be reframed by extremist clerics or online preachers as spiritual quests, propelling individuals down radical pathways. Case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, and other European contexts illustrated how poorly regulated mosques, church-based gatherings, or online sermon platforms become incubators for black-and-white “us versus them” worldviews. In the Q&A portion, participants asked how to respond to these manipulative uses of scripture and religious tradition. Panelists recommended localized interventions—such as forging relationships with credible faith leaders and introducing interfaith civic projects—that resonate strongly with middle-aged faithful who seek purpose and moral clarity.
Extremist Narratives in Play: Gaming and Digital Spaces as Radicalization Arenas (November 27, 2024). Shifting focus to the intersection of technology and radical propaganda, the third event featured 3 experts examining the ways extremist recruiters exploit online gaming communities. The speakers explained how multi-player gaming platforms, particularly those equipped with voice chat, user-generated content, or private messaging systems—serve as incubators for extremist memes and conspiratorial messages. Investigations reveal that some middle-aged gamers not only interact with these extremist-themed servers but also become susceptible to radical “friendly” acquaintances who exploit emotional connections built over shared gaming interests. The panelists cited disturbing evidence of curated “alt-right” infiltration of gaming servers, along with recruitment drives that mobilize older adults disillusioned by mainstream politics. Though such phenomena were once dismissed as fringe, participants agreed on the rising risk, especially amid pandemic-era surges in online leisure time. Calls to action included improved moderation by gaming companies, expanded digital literacy tailored for older adults, and multi-stakeholder cooperation to track extremist discourse within less supervised online spaces.
The Nexus Between Disinformation, Radicalization, and Violent Extremism (January 28, 2025) . In the concluding webinar, 4 journalists and academics scrutinized how maliciously spread misinformation—whether in the form of viral conspiracy theories, “fake news” links, or deepfake videos—shapes radical mindsets. This session detailed how any protracted public crisis, from electoral turmoil to geopolitical conflict, opens the door for extremist actors to fill informational voids with sensational narratives. The speakers linked the rise of domestic extremist factions, such as anti- vaccine militias in certain parts of Europe, to a broader network of global conspiratorial rhetoric, some of which is covertly financed or promoted by foreign state actors. In focusing on the age question, panelists noted that middle-aged users often harbor an inherent cynicism toward official sources, making them more inclined to accept plausible sounding but misleading materials. The proposed countermeasures revolved around stronger “early-warning” systems that rapidly flag the spread of conspiratorial posts, cross-sector initiatives to rebuild institutional trust, and direct engagement with individuals who show partial inclinations toward extremist interpretations.
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe Programme Under Grant Agreement no 101095290.
Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
UK participant in Horizon Europe Project SMIDGE is supported by UKRI grant number 10056282 (De Montfort University).
