Kosovo-Spain Relations: How to move on in 2025

This paper seeks to provide a thorough analysis of Spain’s stance regarding Kosovo and, accordingly, presents a practical roadmap for 2025 and beyond that is designed to mitigate political risk within Spain while enabling the unlocking of Kosovo’s progression towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

The key argument of the paper is that Kosovo’s context fundamentally differs from Catalonia, and the Basque Country. This distinction arises from the fact that Kosovo’s independence emerged from Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution, UN administration (UNMIK), and the Ahtisaari Plan, establishing it as a sui generis case under international law, unlike Spain’s internal regions. Furthermore, Spain’s non-recognition stance is primarily referred to its domestic precedent fears and by its rigid understanding of the international legal framework, even though the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2010 Advisory Opinion concluded that Kosovo’s declaration did not violate international law. Despite this, status-neutral cooperation is growing in effectiveness, as evidenced by the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), visa liberalisation, and progress toward Council of Europe membership. However, advancement in the EU-facilitated Dialogue with Serbia is identified as the key to unlocking broader engagement from Spain and the other non-recognisers. Finally, the positive momentum from 2024, including the implementation of visa‑free travel, the Council of Europe direction, and the ongoing NATO/OSCE contacts, creates new and practical channels for fostering people‑to‑people, academic, diplomatic, cultural, and business ties that can gradually shift narratives within Spain.

Below are listed some of the main findings identified in the report on how to move forward the Kosovar-Spanish relationship:

Prioritise a “do not harm” approach and address Spanish sensitivities directly. This means de‑linking Kosovo from Spain’s domestic debates and communicating the sui generis case with precision, using careful references to Catalonia and the Basque Country only to underline the legal and historical differences rather than to draw parallels.

Break the “Kosovo taboo” in Spain through status‑neutral diplomacy. Practical steps include using NATO, OSCE, UN, and EU formats for informal contacts with Spanish officials and pairing those engagements with cultural diplomacy, tourism promotion, and business forums so that Kosovo becomes a normalised topic in Spain’s public and private spheres.

Link progress to the EU Dialogue with Serbia. Support the revival and implementation of the process under the new EU Special Representative, correlate Dialogue milestones with Council of Europe accession and EU incentives, and widen the political space for Madrid to engage constructively.

Open parliamentary and expert diplomacy tracks. Facilitate Spanish MPs’ fact‑finding visits to Kosovo’s multiethnic municipalities and expand partnerships with Spanish universities and think tanks, helping to entrench the sui generis narrative among influential policy and academic communities.

Leverage the momentum from 2024 to “make it difficult to say no”. Scale up people‑to‑people mobility following visa liberalisation, promote joint academic programs and exchanges, and use status‑neutral mechanisms to deepen cooperation without forcing the recognition question.

The paper recommends that Kosovar stakeholders launch an awareness campaign clarifying the differences between Kosovo and Catalonia/Basque Country, referencing the ICJ opinion. This campaign should target both Spanish institutional actors and the general public.

It also suggests increasing engagement between Kosovo and Spain through international forums like NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as via informal events such as conferences and symposia.

Establishing a parliamentary visit program for Spanish foreign affairs committees focusing on the Ahtisaari Plan and minority rights, alongside sustained academic and think-tank collaboration, could further promote bilateral dialogue without implying recognition of status.

The concluding remark of the paper is that while an immediate U-turn of Spain’s approach regarding Kosovo’s statehood recognition is unlikely to happen, the potential for immediate and impactful progress in their relation is highly possible. Most importantly, by addressing Spanish concerns, utilising status-neutral platforms, and aligning initiatives with the EU Dialogue, Kosovo may achieve practical advancements, shape perceptions within Spain, and further its progression towards European integration.